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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
At the  end  of  2006,  a  new  System  for  Promotion  of Personal  Autonomy  and  Assistance  for
Persons  in a Situation  of  Dependency  (SAAD)  was  established  in  Spain  through  the  approval
of the  Act  39/2006  of  14th  December  (the Dependency  Act,  DA).  The  DA acknowledged
the  universal  entitlement  of  Spanish  citizens  to social  services.  The  recent  economic  crisis
added degrees  of uncertainty  to  several  dimensions  of  the  SAAD  implementation  process.
Firstly,  the  political  consensus  on  which  its foundation  rested  upon  has  weakened.  Secondly,
implementation  of  the  SAAD  was  hampered  by  several  challenges  that  emerged  in  the
context of the  economic  crisis.  Thirdly,  the  so-called  “dependency  limbo”  (i.e.  the  existence
of a large  number  of people  eligible  for beneﬁts  but who  do  not  receive  them)  has  become  a
structural  feature  of the  system.  Finally,  contrary  to the  spirit  of  the  DA, monetary  beneﬁts
have become  the  norm  rather  than  a  last  resort.  High  heterogeneity  across  regions  regarding
the number  of beneﬁciaries  covered  and  services  provided  reveal  the  existence  of  regional
inequity  in  access  to long-term  care  services  in  the country.  Broadly,  the  current  evidence
on the state  of  the  SAAD  suggests  the  need  to improve  the  quality  of governance,  to  enhance
coordination  between  health  and  social  systems,  to  increase  the  system’s  transparency,  to
foster  citizens’  participation  in  decision-making  and  to  implement  a systematic  monitoring
of the  system.
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organization of health care systems but also the re-
deﬁnition of long-term care services. Thus, the Act 39/2006
of 14th December on Promotion of Personal Autonomy
and Assistance for Persons in a Situation of Dependency
(Dependency Act or DA) was  passed to create a new
System for Promotion of Personal Autonomy and Assis-
tance for Persons in Situation of Dependency (SAAD) [1].
The DA granted universal entitlement to social services
with eligibility set on the basis of degree of depen-
dency. This entailed such a large-scale structural change
in organizing long-term care (LTC), that it was  coined
as the building of Spain’s Welfare State’s fourth pillar
[2].
en access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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1.1. Content of the Dependency Act: main features of the
SAAD
The main features of the SAAD prescribed by the
DA are: public funded provisions; effectively equal,
non-discriminatory universal access for all dependents;
commitment to organize services to allow beneﬁciaries
to remain in their community/environment of reference
whenever possible; and assurance of services’ quality, sus-
tainability and accessibility. Despite the SAAD’s design to
provide universal coverage to dependents, users still share
the associated costs through co-payments. The economic
memorandum of the DA estimated that, on average, a third
of the ﬁnancing contribution towards the SAAD would cor-
respond to users’ co-payments [3]. The magnitude of the
co-payment varied according to the economic situation of
the beneﬁciary with sharp differences across regions [4].
Launched in 2007, the SAAD’s implementation was  con-
ceived as a stepwise process: starting with particularly
vulnerable individuals with higher degrees of dependency
(i.e. severe dependents) and progressively extending cov-
erage to moderate and mild dependents. The procedure to
assess applicants and its ability to identify eligible beneﬁ-
ciaries and to determine their needs are the cornerstones
of the system. Three levels of dependency were deﬁned by
the DA (mild, moderate, severe) with dependents ranked
according to an ofﬁcial scale (originally published in BOE
(Boletín Oﬁcial del Estado) 2007 [5] and slightly revised
in BOE 2011 [6]). This scale considers 47 tasks grouped
into ten activities (eating and drinking, control of physical
needs, bathing and hygiene, other physical care, dress-
ing and undressing, maintaining one’s health, mobility,
moving inside the home, moving outside the home, and
housework). The ﬁnal score is the sum of the weights of
the tasks for which the individual has difﬁculty, multi-
plied by the degree of supervision required and the weight
assigned to that activity. Depending on the ﬁnal sum of
the weight obtained, the degree of dependence is deter-
mined as: between 0 and 24 points, not eligible; 25–39
points, mild level 1; 40–49 points, mild level 2; 50–64
points, moderate level 1; 65–74 points, moderate level 2;
75–89 points, severe level 1; and 90–100 points, severe
level 2.
The DA did not specify the intensity of services. This
point was developed in subsequent legislation. For exam-
ple, the Royal Decree 727/2007 determined that the
intensity of home help service should be between 70 and
90 monthly hours for severe-level 2 dependent people,
55–70 monthly hours for severe-level 1 dependent people,
40–55 for moderate-level 2 dependent people and 30–40
for moderate-level 1 dependent people [7]. Subsequent
regulations eliminated existing levels within grades and
reduced the intensity of in-kind and cash beneﬁts [8].
The 17 autonomous regions (Autonomous Communi-
ties, ACs) are responsible for the provision of beneﬁts and
services established by the DA. The Ministry of Health,
Social Policies and Equality (MSPSI) sets a threshold of
minimum services and beneﬁts for allocation to eligible
people dependent upon degree of dependence. Additional
resources are provided by each region to complement con-
tributions made by the national government.olicy 120 (2016) 1177–1182
The DA designs a system for autonomy and depen-
dency care consisting of a minimum level of protection
established by the state, and an additional level of protec-
tion funded exclusively by the ACs. The economic memo-
randum of the Law indicated that in 2015, when the SAAD
was  fully operational, the ﬁnancial contributions would be
42.6% by the ACs, 23.7% by the central government and
33.7% by the beneﬁciaries through co-payments. The per-
centage corresponding to ACs (42.6%) included 1,777 mil-
lion euros that regional governments had previously used
to cover dependency care before the DA enactment [3].
2. Impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on implementation
of the SAAD
The 2008 ﬁnancial crisis and its recessive economic
aftermath have taken a toll on the SAAD. The initial fore-
casts were altered by several royal decree laws (RDLs)
enacted over the following years (see details below).
The implementation of austerity policies hampered the
planned progressive implementation of the SAAD in its very
early stages as follows:
1. Public expenditure contraction: the SAAD is mainly
funded by general taxes. Since the economic crisis
greatly affected the general state tax revenues (decrease
of 30% from 2007–2010) [9], most public services,
such as dependency, education and health, were like-
wise affected [10]. Consequently, data reported by the
Spanish Dependency Care Observatory shows decreased
annual public spending per SAAD user from 8,648 euros
in 2009 to 7401 in 2011 and 6879 in 2013 (latest data
available) [11]. In fact, estimates from the State Asso-
ciation of Social Services Directors and Managers [12]
found an accumulated budget cut of 2,865 million euros
for the SAAD from 2012–2015. Simultaneously, the esti-
mated annual co-payment per user grew from 961 euros
in 2009 to 1,614 in 2013 [11]. Critics suggest that the
DA’s equity principle is not met with the current, regres-
sive model of cost-sharing. The lower-middle incomes
are supporting proportionately more payments than the
upper middle-incomes [13].
2. Decrease in services intensity: The RDL 20/2012 was
particularly relevant in reducing the intensity (hours)
of home help support which raised concerns about
the sufﬁciency of those services, particularly for major
dependents [14]. Furthermore, conditions for entitle-
ment to monetary beneﬁts for family care hardened
parallel to a 15% reduction in allocated funding [11].
3. “Stagnation” of actual access to beneﬁts: The initial fore-
cast regarding access to beneﬁts for dependents was
altered by several enacted RDLs over the years. First,
the RDL 20/2011 blocked all requests for evaluating
level 2 moderate dependents that were not evaluated
before the end of 2011. This caused a two-year delay in
the DA application, and a one year delay for mild level
1 dependents (unable to request beneﬁts until 2014).
Afterwards, the RDL 2/2012 on State Budget [15] ren-
dered mild dependents (level 1 and 2) unable to request
any beneﬁts until 2014. Finally, the RDL 20/2012 on
“urgent measures to ensure NHS’s sustainability and to
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Sig. 1. Implementation of the Dependency Act. * Mild dependents level
eriod  of time during which all mild dependents level 1 should be covere
revious years.
improve the quality and safety of its services” [8] implied
another delay in access for moderate dependents clas-
siﬁed within level 1 until July 2015 (see Fig. 1). Another
notorious consequence is the “dependency limbo”: indi-
viduals ofﬁcially assessed as entitled to beneﬁts who
have not actually received any (in-kind or monetary)
provisions. The number of positive entitlement assess-
ments more than doubled from 2008 to 2010 to over
one million ofﬁcial beneﬁciaries (see Fig. 2). Meanwhile,
those waiting in the “dependency limbo” grew to over
300,000 people in 2011. However, since 2012, this ﬁg-
ure has more than halved because of the attrition rate.
Entitled beneﬁciaries who died (often before receiving
any beneﬁts) largely outnumber the new waiting plain-
tiffs [11]. This situation grew cumbersome in July 2015
when the SAAD’s implementation reached the second
planned step: the inclusion of people assessed as moder-
ate dependents. As a result, the size of the “dependency
limbo” increased by nearly 434,000 dependents [16].
Fig. 2. Evolution of the number of individuals favourably evaluated and numb
ource: Data from IMSERSO [16].entered the system in July 2015. However, no transition period (i.e. the
 SAAD) has been established, as for other categories of dependents in the
The extended coverage has repopulated the “limbo” and
forced the SAAD to unsustainably provide services for
new users (mild dependents) with decreasing resources.
4. Shifting the beneﬁts basket’s composition: contrary to the
spirit of the DA, the monetary beneﬁts have become a
usual practice, In October 2015, 63% of social services
consisted of in-kind services and 37% were ﬁnancial ben-
eﬁts [16]. The cause is closely related to the economic
crisis. From the funder’s perspective with severe bud-
getary constraints, cash beneﬁts are more affordable
than investing or contracting out for service provisions.
From the families’ perspective, cash beneﬁts are pre-
ferred because: (i) they represent income entry for
the household (high unemployment rate and 770,000
households with no income entry) and (ii) families do
not have to bear the co-payment for in-kind services.
However, an unintended consequence of cash beneﬁts
for family care is lower than planned job creation in the
social services sector [4,17].
er of individuals receiving social services, in thousands (2008–2015).
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AAD. Note: Regional governments are captured by several positions within the
AAD, which varies from region to region.
Box 1: Strengths and weaknesses associated to
the SAAD
Pros – strengths Cons – weaknesses
Recognition of universal access
to dependence care
Financial shortfall
The gist of the Act: promoting
personal autonomy
Lack of coordination between the
Central Administration and ACs
Entry of an important number of
individuals into the system
Large heterogeneity on its
implementation across ACs
Excessively focused on economic
aids
Existence of a “dependency
limbo”
Doubts on the coordination
among health care and social
services
Absence of rigorous evaluation ofFig. 3. Position of stakeholders and their inﬂuence at the origin of the S
graph, reﬂecting the geographical heterogeneity in their support to the S
3. Stakeholders position
Stemming from the PSOE’s (Social Democratic Party)
2004 election program, the DA was passed in their sec-
ond year of government (PSOE, 2004) through a pact with
the opposition (PP-Conservative Party). The Act received
wide support within Parliament [18]. Organizations rep-
resenting dependents (e.g. UNAF, FEAPS, CEOMA, CERMI)
were strongly supportive of the DA (see [19]) despite some
groups’ reluctance to face co-payments [20]. In 2006, the
DA had the general citizens’ endorsement with 9/10 citi-
zens (87.8%) approving that informal carers be recognized
as employed with a salary and Social Security coverage [21].
Some ACs thought the DA violates regional competencies
(e.g. Basque Country) [18]. Providers’ inﬂuence over the
SAAD was scarce, but their support remains high over time.
However, the political change and associated cuts fol-
lowing the economic crisis broke the initial political
consensus. Major political parties prioritized other social
policies (e.g. pension beneﬁts) over the SAAD [22]. The ini-
tially strong patients’ inﬂuence on the creation of the SAAD
has decreased.
Hence, changing stakeholders’ positions have delayed
DA enforcement through the lack of expected funding from
the central government and the heterogeneity in the imple-
mentation of the SAAD across regions (e.g. some ACs have
fully applied the law while others do not prioritize it in
their agendas) (Fig. 3).
4. Preliminary outcomes
Nine years since its implementation, the system exhibits
both several strengths and many weaknesses (see Box 1).
First, the baseline projections misestimated the number
and relative proportion of beneﬁciaries [14]. In October
2015, the actual people entitled as ‘severe dependent’
reached around 348,000, while initial projections esti-
mated 252,000. Projections for people in ‘mild status’ werethe system
overestimated (around 648,000 vs. an actual 382,000) (see
Fig. 4) [8,14]. Of assessed individuals, 29% are classiﬁed as
‘severe dependent’ and 38% as ‘moderate dependents’ [16].
These proportions are well beyond those found in other
European countries [8,14,23].
Second, the proportion of above 65 year olds receiving
social services (i.e. domiciliary care, day care, nursing home
care) peaked in 2012 and declined afterwards. Only the
proportion of people receiving telecare has continuously
increased, doubling from 2008–2014 [16].
Additionally, the private insurance market for depen-
dents in Spain continues to be irrelevant. In 2014, only
35,074 people (0.08% of the Spanish population aged 18
and over) subscribed into private insurance [24].
Moreover, the SAAD is characterized by high het-
erogeneity across regions in terms of the number of
beneﬁciaries covered and services provided [16]. Firstly,
waiting lists for social services vary by region from 10% of
the total individuals entitled to beneﬁts to over 40% [25].
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[accessed 18.11.15].
[2] García-Armesto S, Abadia-Taira MB,  Durán A, Hernández-ig. 4. Comparative ﬁgures of the initial expectations of the number of ben
in  1,000 people).
ource: Data from MTAS [4] and IMSERSO [16].
econdly, the provision of public residential services oscil-
ates from 2.44 places to 0.57 per 100 individuals. Likewise,
he intensity of home aids ranges from 35.86 to 6.39 weekly
ours. In fact, several regions have not provided any home
id services since the DA’s implementation [16].
In 2013, the National Association of Directors and Man-
gers of Social Services developed a performance index to
easure the degree of deployment of social services in
ach region [26]. According to this index, the social ser-
ices deployment is classiﬁed as inadequate or irrelevant in
 out of 17 regions. Only 3 regions reached a medium-high
evel of performance, resulting in large differences relate
o extreme disparities in social services expenditure across
egions. For instance, the public expenditure in social ser-
ices per inhabitant in the Basque Country is four times
igher than in the Balearic Islands [25].
Additionally, inequity in access to long-term care ser-
ices was already documented during the early stages of
he DA’s implementation (2007–2008). Comparisons of
tilization in long-term care beneﬁts across the socioe-
onomic spectrum found the use of professional services
oncentrated among economically better-off groups while
tilization of intensive informal care was concentrated
mong those worst-off [27]. Unfortunately, no up-to-
ate evaluation is available to assess changes in citizens’
nequitable access to the SAAD beneﬁts.
A minimum set of core management data (number of
pplicants, resolutions made, number of beneﬁts and type)
s published monthly by the MSPSI. This data is insufﬁcient
o determine strengths and weaknesses of the system. As a
esult, a proper evaluation of the SAAD’s performance is still
ending. Thus, the evaluation of the SAAD and the identiﬁ-
ation of successes (and failures) are particularly relevant
iven that the aim of social services is to promote personal
utonomy (not only the attention of dependency). Simul-
aneously, the NHS is responsible for protecting population
ealth (not only the attention of the disease). Both systems
hare common goals that would beneﬁt from coordinated
ction [28–30]. At the time of writing, evidence suggests
hat several ACs are working towards these goals, but eval-
ation and dissemination of these experiences are almost
nknown in Spain [31].s for 2015 and the current number of beneﬁciaries by level of dependency
5. Conclusion
The creation of the SAAD has led to improvements in
dependent peoples’ rights in Spain. Despite great expecta-
tions during its creation nine years ago [19,21], the SAAD
failed to meet them.
In 2013, dependency funding reached 0.65% of GDP (71%
from public resources and 29% from household resources)
[32]. These ﬁgures are lower than other European countries
[33]. The ﬁnancial inadequacy, intensiﬁed by the economic
crisis that has accompanied the system since its incep-
tion [11,14,25] has brought many unforeseen problems
to the SAAD’s implementation. The dependency limbo,
the predominant use of cash beneﬁts, and the regressive
co-payment system reﬂect that. Additional shortcomings
include the lack of systematic evaluation of the quality of
services provided, and the lack of benchmarking between
different programs and between provision models across
regions.
A weak private insurance market for dependency, the
uneven development of the SAAD between regions, and the
lack of coordination between central and regional govern-
ments show the varying levels of priority political actors
give towards promoting the personal autonomy and atten-
tion to people with long-term care needs. Also, the lack
of transparency in both systems and a lacking culture of
accountability towards citizens makes the evaluation and
dissemination of experiences clearly insufﬁcient [34].
Altogether, the current state of the SAAD indicates the
need to improve ﬁnancial resources, the governance sys-
tem quality, the coordination between health and social
systems, system transparency, participation of citizens in
decision-making and continuous overall system evalua-
tions.
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